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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF TRESPASS AB INITIO
In Cline v Tait', plaintiff was arrested and incarcerated
for a night before being presented to a magistrate. Plaintiff
sued the sheriff for false imprisonment. The court denied re-
covery, holding that since false imprisonment is the unlawful
violation of the personal liberty of another, it does not result
until the moment at which an imprisonment becomes unlaw-
ful; and an arresting officer cannot be held liable for damages
theretofore accruing.
Similar decisions on such facts have provoked consider-
able controversy, for the Montana holding has placed Mon-
tana among the few states' which have rejected the common
law action of trespass ab initio--in cases of false imprison-
ment, often referred to as the doctrine of "relation back."
The majority of states still adhere to the old common law rule
in such cases. However, Montana does have support for its
views in the American Law Institute Restatement of The Law
of Torts as follows:
"If the actor, having obtained the custody of another
by a privileged arrest . . . fails to use due diligence to
take the other promptly before a proper court ... the ac-
tor's misconduct makes him liable to the other only for
such harm as is caused thereby and does not make the
actor liable for the arrest or for keeping the other in cus-
tody prior to the misconduct.'
In recent times, there have been judicial expressions of dis-
favor of the doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has
frowned upon the doctrine,' and law writers have long coun-
seled its death.
The purpose of this comment is to prove that the Mon-
tana minority holding is the better view, that the majority
common law idea has been outmoded.
The Montana Code' requires an officer to bring his pris-
oner before a magistrate or court to determine whether the
prisoner is to be released or held for trial, and to do this in a
reasonable time. While this is primarily for the protection of
the prisoner, a public interest also is involved-the speedy ad-
ministration of justice.
'Cline v. Tait (1942) 129 P. (2d) 89.
'Smith, Surviving Fictions (1918) 27 YALE LAW JourNAL 147.
'Restatement of the Law of Torts.
'MeGuire v. United States, 1927, 273 U. S. 95, 47 S. Ct. 259, 71 L. Ed.
556.
RossmF-, ON ToRTS, 1941, p. 158.
OR. C. M. 1935 See. 11766.
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In the principal case the officer had made a proper and
valid arrest, but there was a subsequent dereliction of duty or
misconduct on his part in not bringing the prisoner before a
magistrate in a "reasonable" time. One performing an act
by virtue of legal authority is liable for any subsequent tor-
tious conduct. It is at this point that the doctrine of "relation
back" enters. The majority of jurisdictions would hold that
the misconduct dislodges the actor's privilege in making the
arrest and makes him liable for the entire imprisonment in
the same manner as if the original arrest were unprivileged,
on the grounds of the trespass ab initio doctrine.
This fiction had its origin in the ancient law of distress
of property," and received its first statement by Coke in the
"Six Carpenters Case."' Coke reports:
". .. first, it was resolved when an entry, authority
or license, is given, to anyone by the law and he doth abuse
it, he shall be a trespasser ab initio; but where an entry,
authority, or license is given by the party, and he abuses
it, then he must be punished for his abuse, but shall not be
a trespasser ab initio."
As a second proposition,
"It was resolved per totam curiam, that not doing can-
not make the party who has authority or license by law a
trespasser ab initio, because not doing is no trespass."
This latter proposition is based upon the theory that in such
a case the landowner might choose his own licensee, and
should take the risk of possible abuse of the license.' Prosser
states that the subsequent act must be one which in itself
would amount to a trespass, and that a mere omission, such as
a failure to pay for drinks after entering an inn is not suf-
ficient."0 He is of the opinion that this view has been due, in
some respect, to the formal requirements of the trespass action.
It would seem that the early development of the fiction
was confined almost wholly to the abuse of some privilege."
Thus, the doctrine most commonly applied in case of damage
done after a privileged entry upon land," or the misuse or
wrongful disposition of goods seized under process of author-
77Holdsworth, History of English Law, 1925, 499.
'PROsSER ON TORTS, p. 157.
'Cole v. Drew (1871) 44 Vt. 49.
"Walsh v. Brown (1907) 194 Mass. 317, 80 N. E. 465.
"11 HARV. L. REv. 277 (1897).12Supra, note 5.
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ity of law," or where the reversioner entered to see if the ten-
ant in possession was committing waste."
Prosser is of the further opinion that the doctrine is a pro-
cedural device, "due to the misplaced ingenuity of some medi-
eval pleader," which had been designed to circumvent the
rule that the action of trespass would not lie where the orig-
inal entry was not wrongful.' A writer in 11 HARvARD LAW
REVIEW 277 agrees with Prosser, stating that as long as pro-
cedure was the life-blood of law, this fiction of trespass ab
initio had served to overcome certain procedural difficulties
which tended to obstruct the administration of justice in par-
ticular cases. Holmes supports this view, saying:
"The rule, that, if a man abuse an authority given
him by law, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, altho now
it looks like a rule of substantive law and is limited to a
certain class of cases, in its origin was only a rule of evi-
dence by which, when such rules were few and rude, the
original intent was presumed conclusively from the sub-
sequent conduct.""
True, in the principal case the court did not dwell on the
question at any great length, seeming to take it for granted
that there was no great controversy present. While it is be-
lieved that the court reached a proper result, the case is not
so easy on the precedent. The best argument in favor of the
doctrine is that it affords a valuable correction for abuses by
public officers; but the existence of adequate remedies for the
subsequent misconduct should be sufficient." In the field of
arrest there is much conflict as to the application of the prin-
ciple." A failure to make a return of process, even though it
is only an omission, is regarded as so identified with the ar-
rest itself as to render it invalid, and make the officer liable
from the beginning." Failure to use due diligence to bring the
prisoner promptly before a magistrate is given the same effect
by most courts,' although there is authority to the contrary."
A release of the prisoner without any presentment before a
'PROsSER ON TORTS p. 157; Salmond, Law of Torts 8th Ed. p. 222 (1934).
"Commonwealth v. Rubin (1896) 165 Mass. 453, 43 NXE. 200.
"Supra, note 12.
'28 COLUM. L. REV. p. 841 (1928).
"Bohlen and Shulman, EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MISCONDUCT UPON A
LAWFUL ARREST, (1928) 28 COLUM. L. REv. 841.
nSupra, note 17.
"Gibson v. Holmes (1905) 78 Vt. 110, 68 A. 11.
"Peckham v. Warner Bros. Pictures (1939) 36 Cal. App. 2d 214, 97 P.
2d 472.
"PRossEn ON TORTS, p. 159.
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court is regarded as a trespass ab initio by some courts,' and
not by others.' As to any mistreatment of the pi'isoner," or
efforts to coerce him into compliance with orders,' there are
surprisingly few decisions. The doctrine ought to be ban-
ished at least from the law of arrest. In the great majority
of cases the delay is obviously due to some carelessness or
oversight on the part of the officer after the arrest. It would
be unjust to make the officer liable to the prisoner simply be-
cause he had failed to comply with a mere matter of detail.
The reasons given by the courts for the continuance of the
doctrine lack conviction. As an example, one such reason is
that the abuse of the privilege creates a conclusive presump-
tion that the actor intended from the outset to use the public
authority as a cloak under which to enter for a wrongful pur-
pose. The majority of American courts have seen fit to con-
tinue nursing this common law fiction along, by saying that
subsequent conviction of the prisoner does not release the of-
ficer from liability for his tortious conduct."
Legal fictions have played an important role in the de-
velopment of a system of law. The law at this point has at-
tained sufficient maturity so that it no longer need recognize
the fiction of trespass ab initio. The Montana court has adopt-
ed this mature viewpoint, as its codes abolish the old common
law forms of action so that it is unnecessary to support this
fiction on the theory that it is a procedural device."
It is admitted that an officer should be liable for his tor-
tious acts, and our courts recognize the rights of the prisoner
by providing him with means by which he may bring an ac-
tion against the offending officer for malicious prosecution."
Certainly if our courts have developed sufficiently to be will-
ing and able to punish such official misconduct, then there
is no room in our tort law for anomalous civil liability to a
plaintiff who has suffered no harm from the misconduct.
The weight of authority has based its holding on prece-
dent.' This is adequate at times, but it should not be followed
2Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hindsell, (1907) 76 Kan. 74, 90 P, 800.
RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS, s 136.
'Supra, note 1.
"
4Halley v. Mix (1829) 3 Wend., N. Y. 350, 20 Am. Dec. 702.2
'McGuire v. United States (1927) 273 U. S. 95, 47 S. Ct. 259, 71 L.
Ed. 556.
-"Supra, note 8.
"Supra, note 22.
2Supra, note 25.
"PoLLOCK ON TORTS, 12th Ed. p. 402 (1923) SALMOND ON TORTS 6th Ed.
232 (1924).
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where it has been plainly discredited, even in the field where it
has had its origin." Especially is this true in this case where
the prisoner has adequate tort remedies.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of the writer that the hold-
ing in the principal case is the correct view. The reason for
the Common Law doctrine no longer exists inasmuch as plain-
tiff has a remedy against the offending officer where he can
prove actual harm. Accordingly, the doctrine of trespass ab
initio should be discarded.
-Ted James.
1943
"PRossER ON TORTS p. 157. Supra, note 8.
ORAL CONTRACTS TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY
AT DEATH
In Gravelin v. Porier' the plaintiff sued the administrator
upon an oral agreement of deceased to leave the plaintiff a
"child's share in the estate." The estate was composed of both
real and personal property. The Supreme Court held that such
an oral agreement was within the Montana statute of frauds'
both as an "agreement for the sale of real property" and an
"agreement for the sale of goods." In Rowe v. Eggum' an oral
agreement not to change an existing will was also held to be
within the statute of frauds.
In these cases Montana is in accord with the prevailing
rule.' However, in other states, distinctions are sometimes made
so that certain types of such oral agreements are withdrawn
from the statute of frauds." For example, a contract to die in-
testate has been held not to be within the statute.' But tho
there are no direct decisions on these distinctions, the language
'(1926) 77 Mont. 260, 250 P. 823.
2R. C. M. 1935, §10, 613.
'(1938) 107 Mont. 378, 81 P. (2d) 189.
'Holz v. Stephen (1936) 362 Ill. 527, 200 N. E. 601,106, A. L. R. 737; Nelson
v. Schoonover (1913) 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147; Hamilton v. Thirston
(1901) 93 Md. 213, 48 Atl. 709; Alexander v. Lewes (1918) 194 Wash.
32, 175 P. 572; Thompson v. Weimar (1939) 1 Wash. (2d) 145, 95 p.
(2d) 772. ScHouLEa, WrLLs (6th ed. 1923) §696, p. 795. Frauds, Stat-
ute of, 24 C.J. §170.
8Schnebly, Contract8 to Make Te8tarnentary Dispositions, 24 Mich. L.
Rev. 749 (1926).
'Stahl v. Stevenson (1918) 102 Kan. 447, 171 P. 1164; Quinn v. Quinn
(1894) 5 S.D. 328, 58 N.W. 808, 49 Am. L. R. 875.
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